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Abstract. In this paper we propose a possible alternative for conventional pay-as-clear type multiunit 
auctions commonly used for the clearing of day-ahead power exchanges, and analyse some of its 
characteristic features in comparison with conventional clearing. In the proposed framework, instead of the 
concept of the uniform market clearing price, we introduce limit prices separately for supply and demand 
bids, and in addition to the power balance constraint, we formulate constraints for the income balance of the 
market. The total traded quantity is used as the objective function of the formulation. The concept is 
demonstrated on a simple example and is compared to the conventional approach in small-scale market 
simulations. 
1 Introduction 
Since the process of the liberalization of electricity 
markets began, auction designs for day-ahead electricity 
markets have been in the focus of research [1,2]. As 
electricity is a special good in the sense that it cannot be 
economically stored, electricity market designs must 
always reflect the need for supply-demand balance. An 
additional characteristic feature of European-type 
portfolio bidding electricity markets is that the bid types 
available on the supply side usually reflect the technical 
limitations of plants and the non-convex nature of 
generation costs, originating e.g. from significant start-
up costs of the units. The most common and most 
recently used bid type which allows the bidder to 
distribute its start-up costs among several trading periods 
is the so called block order [3], which, in contrast to 
standard hourly bids, must fully be accepted or rejected 
(‘fill-or-kill’ condition). Further constructions, which 
allow for the consideration of technological and 
economic constraints are the so called minimum income 
condition (MIC) orders [4] and scheduled-stop condition 
orders. Although the inclusion of such orders in the 
market clearing algorithm may imply computational 
challenges (generally because of the consideration of bid 
incomes, which include quadratic terms), efficient 
formulations for these bids have been already proposed 
[5,6].  
All of the above mentioned market models are based 
on the so-called and dominantly used ‘pay-as-clear’ or 
‘marginal pricing’ principle. This principle is based on 
the concept of the market clearing price (MCP). The 
acceptance of standard hourly bids is uniquely 
determined by the MCP, and the accepted bids are paid 
off according to the MCP (not according to the bid price). 
The MCP is usually calculated in order to maximize the 
total social welfare (TSW) – the total utility of 
consumption minus the total cost of production. Due to 
non-convexities however, a uniform MCP not always 
exists (see [7]), and this results in the phenomena of so-
called paradoxically rejected block orders [8].  
The most common alternative for the pay-as-clear 
principle is the pay-as-bid auction, where accepted bids 
are not paid off according to the MCP, but to the original 
bid price [9]. Pay-as-bid auctions however typically not 
used for two-sided auctions as day-ahead electricity 
auctions in the electricity industry, but rather for one-
sided auctions as cross-border capacity auctions. 
Regarding conventional pay-as-clear approaches, the 
decoupling of prices for nodes and zones in the case of 
connected markets is a commonly researched topic [10], 
while on the other hand, the decoupling the supply and 
demand prices has only been recently proposed as a 
possible approach [11]. 
Our aim in this paper is to start from the simple 
formulation of a one-period pay-as-clear market, and 
propose a pay-as-bid type market, in which limit prices 
different for the supply and demand side determine the 
set of accepted/rejected bids in order to maximize the 
total traded quantity in the market. Bids in this proposed 
framework are paid off in a pay-as-bid fashion. We 
formulate the clearing algorithm of the proposed 
framework to be compatible with the commonly used 
block orders and other complex orders. The dispatch 
implied by the proposed clearing method is 
demonstrated in the case of a simple example with low 
number of bids, and some of its basic characteristics are 
analysed and compared to the classical pay-as-clear 
clearing via simulations of scenarios under market 
uncertainty (random sets of submitted bids). 
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2 Computational formulation 
In this section we first consider a simple market clearing 
model of a classical single period pay-as-clear market, 
then we propose the price-decoupled pay-as-bid clearing 
model. In both cases we suppose that the input of the 
model is the set of bids. For the aim of simplicity, we do 
not consider block bids or any other complex bids in this 
first formulation, thus each bid i (supply or demand as 
indicated by the upper index) is parametrized by a bid 
quantity (qi) [MWh] and a bid price (pi) [EUR/MWh], 
and may be partially accepted as well. We use sign 
convention to identify supply and demand bids: for 
demand bids we suppose qi <0. 
2.1 Pay-as-clear model 
The formulation used for the pay-as-clear model is a 
simplified version of the formalism used in [4-6] (we 
consider here only one period). The variable vector x 
considered in this case is summarized in eq. (1). 
 x = [MCP yS yD z]T  (1) 
MCP stands for the market clearing price, yS and yD 
denote the vectors containing the acceptance indicators 
of supply and demand bids respectively, and z is the 
vector of auxiliary binary variables used in the 
computational formulation of the bid-acceptance 
constraints. The bid acceptance constraints are described 
by equations (2-5). 
 yiD >0  → MCP ≤ piD  (2) 
 yiD <1  → MCP ≥ piD  (3) 
 yiS >0  → MCP ≥ piS  (4) 
 yiS <1  → MCP ≤ piS  (5) 
The implications may be easily implemented with the 
big-M method, as described e.g. in [12], using the binary 
variables in z. Eq. (6) formulates the power balance of 
supply and demand (remember the negative sign of 
demand quantities). 
  ∑i yiD qiD + ∑i yiS qiS = 0  (6) 
The objecive function may be written as 
 max  f =  - ∑i  yiD qiD piD - ∑i yiS qiS piS  (7) 
where the first term corresponds to the utility of 
consumption (the negative sign is due to the negative 
quantity of demand bids), while the second term 
describes the cost of production. 
2.2 Price-decoupled pay-as-bid model 
The formulation for the price-decoupled pay-as-bid 
model proposed in this article is as follows. The variable 
vector may be written as 
 x = [LPS LPD yS yD z]T  (8) 
where LPS and LPDdenote the limit prices for supply 
and demand respectively (the remaining notations are the 
same as before in subsection 2.1). The bid acceptance 
constraints in this case are as described in eqs. (9-12). 
 yiD >0  → LPD ≤ piD  (9) 
 yiD <1  → LPD ≥ piD  (10) 
 yiS >0  → LPS ≥ piS  (11) 
 yiS <1  → LPS ≤ piS  (12) 
In addition to the power balance equation, which is 
of the same form as before (6), in this case we also have 
an inequality constraint, describing that the costs of the 
production should not exceed the income from the 
accepted demand bids. This constraint is described by as 
- ∑i yiDqiDpiD   ≥  ∑i yiS qiS piS   (13)
In this case, the objective function is the total traded 
quantity, as described in eq. (14) 
    f =  - ∑i  yiD qiD + ∑i yiS qiS  (14) 
2.3 Demonstrative example 
In this subsection we demonstrate the difference of the 
two clearing approach, considering a simple example 
(example 1) with 5 demand and 5 supply bids. The bid 
parameters are described in Table 1. 
Table 1. Bid parameters of Example 1 
Bid 
ID 
quantity 
(q) 
bid 
price 
(p) 
Bid 
ID 
quantity 
(q) 
bid 
price 
(p) 
S1 45 40 D1 -80 60 
S2 70 50 D2 -55 55 
S3 55 60 D3 -50 45 
S4 45 65 D4 -70 40 
S5 35 70 D5 -30 35 
The results of the two clearing approaches are 
depicted in Figures 1 and 2. Fig. 1 depicts the results of 
the conventional pay-as-clear method, resulting in the 
well-known scenario: The MCP is determined by the 
intersection point of the supply and demand curves, 
which also determines the traded quantity (115). Bid D2 
is partially accepted in this case. 
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Fig. 1. Result of the clearing of example 1 according to the 
pay-as-clear method. 
 
Fig. 2. Result of the clearing of example 1 according to the 
price-decoupled pay-as-bid method. 
Fig. 2 depicts the results of the price-decoupled pay-
as-bid method. In this case bids S4 and D4 are partially 
accepted. The limit prices for supply and demand (LPS= 
65 and LPD=40 respectively) are set by the solver in 
order to maximize the traded quantity, while keeping the 
power quantities on the supply and demand side and the 
incomes/costs in balance as well. The latter is ensured by 
the equality of the shaded areas to the left and to the 
right of the intersection points of the two curves (1425 
EUR in this case) – in other words, the inequality 
condition described by eq. (13) holds as equality at the 
optimum.  
3 Market simulation results  
In the next step we performed simple market simulations 
to compare the performance of the two clearing method. 
In these simulations, bids were randomly generated from 
the following uniform distributions (denoted by 
U([a,b])). 20-20 bids were generated for the supply and 
demand side. Quantity of bids was taken from U([20,50]) 
in the case of supply and from U([-50,-20]) in the case of 
demand bids. The price of supply bids was taken from 
U([40,70]) while the price of demand bids was taken 
from U([30,60]). 500 simulations were run with the 
above parameters, and in the case of each bid set, the 
pay-as-clear and the pay-as-bid clearing was also 
performed.  
Figure 3. depicts the distribution of the MCP 
regarding the pay-as-clear clearing results. It can be seen 
in the figure that the distribution of the MCP values 
follows a normal distribution – in this case with m=50.1 
and σ= 2.32. Let us note here that studies which aim to 
determine optimal bidding strategies under price 
uncertainty (see e.g. [14]) usually assume uniform 
distribution of the MCP. In contrast, market simulations 
of the current study suggest that assuming normal 
distribution of the MCP is more realistic. 
 
Fig. 3. The distribution of MCP in pay-as-clear simulations. 
Figures 4 and 5 depict the distribution of LPS and 
LPD respectively, which also follow normal 
distributions with parameters: m=60.45 and σ= 3.49 
(LPS), m=40.94 and σ= 3.46 (LPD). Figure 6 depicts the 
comparison of the average traded quantity in the case of 
pay-as-clear and pay-as-bid clearing. As also in the case 
of the simple example used for the demonstration of the 
clearing method, we can see that the traded quantity is 
significantly higher in the case of price-decoupled pay-
as-bid clearing. 
 
Fig. 4. The distribution of LPS in price-decoupled pay-as-bid 
simulations. 
 
Fig. 5. The distribution of LPD in price-decoupled pay-as-bid 
simulations. 
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 Fig. 6. Traded quantity in the case of pay-as-clear (1) and price 
decoupled pay-as-bid (2) clearing with standard deviations. 
4 Discussuion  
In the market simulations we assumed that the set of bids 
is the same in both cases, and analysed the results 
according to this. This assumption has been sufficient for 
our current aim, namely to compare the performance of 
the proposed price-decoupled pay-as-bid clearing 
method with the classical pay-as-clear approach in a 
simple simulation setup, however it may be questionable 
regarding more realistic scenarios. 
Previous studies discuss that in the case of pay-as-bid 
auctions, bidders have incentives to bid at the 
highest/lowest price accepted (regarding supply vs. 
demand) [15], in contrast to pay-as-clear auctions where 
e.g. suppliers make a rational decision if they bid their 
real costs (if start-up and variable costs arise in the same 
time, the situation may be a bit complicated, see the 
reference [14]). This will lead to ‘flattened’ supply and 
demand curves [15]. On the other hand, further studies 
also establish that the ranking of the uniform-price and 
pay-as-bid auctions is ambiguous in both revenue and 
efficiency terms [16], and multiple points of view arise 
from which the two approaches may be compared. 
5 Conclusions and future work  
5.1 Conclusions 
In this study we introduced a possible price-decoupled 
pay-as-bid clearing method for two sided multi-unit 
auctions. The method is based on the concept of limit 
prices, which determine the acceptance/rejection of the 
submitted bids, and are defined distinctly for the supply 
and the demand side (LPS and LPD). The limit prices 
are determined via the clearing method, which is 
formulated as a linear optimization problem. The 
objective of this optimization problem is to maximize the 
total traded quantity, while considering the power 
balance and bid acceptance constraints, where the latter 
are also formulated in linear form, using auxiliary 
integer variables.  The resulting optimization problem is 
a mixed integer linear problem (MILP), which may be 
solved efficiently with the available solvers (e.g. 
CPLEX). The concept of the formalization is compatible 
with special products typically considered in day ahead 
electricity markets (e.g. block orders may be easily 
included in the proposed formulation via binary 
variables). Based on market simulations, we have shown 
that regarding the traded quantity, the price-decoupled 
pay-as-bid method outperforms the classical pay-as-clear 
approach in the case when the same bid set is assumed as 
input for both of the clearing algorithms. This may be a 
beneficial property in markets where the most efficient 
utilization of generating capacities is a priority, and may 
induce more liquid markets as well. 
5.2 Future work 
As discussed in section 3, the used market simulations 
may be made more realistic if we assume agents 
parametrized by demand utility or production costs, and 
assume that they bid in a rational way considering the 
applied auction framework as well in addition to their 
own parameters. This will result in different bid sets for 
the same agents in the case of the two compared method, 
and performance evaluation and comparison may be 
carried out on a more realistic base.  
In addition, the formulation of the optimization 
problem in the proposed approach may be 
complemented with constraints corresponding to carbon 
emission, as motivated by the concept of environmental 
dispatch [17]. 
The concept of price-decoupling may be applied for 
conventional pay-as-clear markets as well [11] – in this 
context the effect of price decoupling on the acceptance 
of paradoxically rejected block orders [8] could be a 
research topic of potential interest. 
Our further aim is to analyse the applicability of the 
proposed method in the case of joint energy-reserve 
markets, where power and reserves are allocated in the 
same time, considering combined offers as well [18]. 
The main motivation in this case is that for appropriate 
clearing of such markets according to the classical pay-
as-clear methods, a wide set of prices must be defined 
and used for energy, reserves and combined bids [19]. 
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